What happened?

The offensive campaign known as Operation 1027, launched by the Brotherhood Alliance, an armed resistance pact comprising a number of militias, is emboldening Myanmar’s resistance forces nationwide. EIU is updating its political stability outlook for the forecast period (2024‑28) accordingly.

Why does it matter?

We expect security risks to remain elevated until at least early 2024. Fluctuating periods of relative stability (such as the first half of 2023) and conflict (such as late 2023) will affect much of Myanmar’s territory, including most of the mountain ranges close to the border (strongholds of ethnic-minority armed organisations), as well as some of the central lowland states occupied by the Burmese (Bamar) majority, such as Sagaing and Magway.

Myanmar will be politically fractured in 2024-28. Nevertheless, the junta is unlikely to fall, despite being in one of its weakest states since the country achieved independence in 1948. It (and its allies) will probably maintain control of about 30‑40% of Myanmar’s territory, or the majority of the country’s central lowlands, encompassing Yangon, Naypyidaw and the Irrawaddy Delta. The junta has suffered mounting casualties, low morale and widespread desertions—which contributed to the success of Operation 1027—but it will be able to regroup and defend locations strategic to its survival. The junta will also benefit from tax revenue from business activity in the major cities, as well as from hydrocarbon export earnings.

About 30-40% of the country will be under the de facto control of different groups of loosely connected resistance actors. The National Unity Government (NUG), the shadow administration formed by officials ousted from the civilian government, has nominally assumed leadership of the resistance. In reality, the NUG neither has full control over the various resistance forces nor is able to provide military supplies, making the armed resistance less united and capable than it may seem.

In 2024‑28 some opposition groups will set up parallel governance (and taxation) structures in areas that they control, although the shadow central government will have very little sway over these institutions. Some signs of co‑ordination between resistance forces have emerged in the wake of Operation 1027, but they are largely opportunistic. This will increase the state of lawlessness and raise operational risk significantly in Myanmar.

What next?

The junta, which seized power in 2021, will be locked in a struggle of attrition with a range of loosely connected resistance forces across the country throughout our forecast period. A negotiated compromise is all but impossible. The junta considers the coup and subsequent conflict necessary for its survival, and in the unlikely event that the junta extends an olive branch to the armed resistance, the latter’s disunity will prevent the formation of a unified negotiating position.

The analysis and forecasts featured in this piece can be found in EIU’s Country Analysis service. This integrated solution provides unmatched global insights covering the political and economic outlook for nearly 200 countries, enabling organisations to identify prospective opportunities and potential risks.